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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Brad Reed was initially a suspect in a burglary investigation, and an officer began to
search his van, pursuant to his consent. When Mr. Reed revoked his initial consent, the officers
began to investigate Mr. Reed for drug or other criminal activity. Methamphetamine was located
after a drug dog sniffed Mr. Reed’s van. After the district court denied his motion to suppress, a
jury convicted him of one count of possession of methamphetamine.
Mr. Reed asserts the district court erred in denying his suppression motion where his
detention was unlawfully extended. He was detained beyond the time reasonably necessary to
conduct the burglary investigation, and for the officers to conduct an investigation into drug
activity or other criminal activity; the stop was prolonged which allowed the drug detection dog
to arrive and conduct a sniff search of Mr. Reed’s van.
Mr. Reed also contends there were a number of trial errors. In what appears to be an
issue of first impression in Idaho, Mr. Reed first asserts that the district court violated his Fourth
Amendment rights by admitting testimony as to Mr. Reed’s “demeanor” and profane language in
revoking his consent to a search of his van. Second, he asserts that the district court erred by
denying his motion for a mistrial after the prosecutor told the jury information the court had
previously ruled inadmissible, and that the prosecutor’s actions constituted misconduct. Third,
he asserts that the prosecutor twice committed misconduct rising to the level of fundamental
error during closing arguments. Initially, the prosecutor used inflammatory language calculated
to appeal to the passions and prejudice of the jury by demeaning and impugning defense
counsel’s arguments. The prosecutor claimed that Mr. Reed was faking his injuries in an attempt
to gain the juror’s sympathy; however, the prosecutor knew the injuries were real—he had
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information from the officers at the scene which supported Mr. Reed’s testimony regarding his
disabilities/injuries—thus the prosecutor’s arguments misrepresented the evidence.

This

misconduct denied Mr. Reed his constitutional right to a fair trial.
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State’s erroneous contention that the district
court did not err in denying Mr. Reed’s motion for a mistrial and that the State did not commit
prosecutorial misconduct.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Reed’s Appellant’s Brief.

They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are

incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUES1
I.

Did the district court err by denying Mr. Reed’s motion to suppress?

II.

Did the district court violate Mr. Reed’s constitutional rights by admitting evidence of his
revocation of consent to search his van?

III.

Did the district court err by denying Mr. Reed’s motion for a mistrial?

IV.

Did the State commit prosecutorial misconduct in its closing arguments?

1

Mr. Reed will address only the State’s arguments as to the mistrial (Issue #3) and the
prosecutorial misconduct (Issue #4). The State’s arguments regarding Issues #1 and #2 are
unavailing and no additional argument is required.
3

ARGUMENT
III.
The District Court Committed Reversible Error When It Denied Mr. Reed’s Motion For A
Mistrial
To the extent that Mr. Reed asserted that the district court did not provide “any
reasoning” as to why it denied the motion for a mistrial (App. Br., p.37); that is incorrect and, as
the State pointed out, Mr. Reed was remiss in inadvertently failing to provide the court’s later
explanation. (Resp. Br., pp.19-21.) Nonetheless, the district court, while it did provide its
reason for denying the motion, such reasoning and legal analysis was inadequate in light of the
standard for a mistrial.
The district court explained its reasons for denying Mr. Reed’s motion for a mistrial after
the jury was excused:
Here’s the critical language. “Here we have somebody who owns the van,” that’s
undisputed. That has nothing to do with the Fourth Amendment issue. So that’s
certainly proper argument. “Who tries to stop the officers from searching his
vehicle.” That’s the phrase that I think Mr. Beus objected to. And then it
continued, “Only after they started it,” well, obviously the officers started the
search. We know that. So that’s a fact, and its permissible.
So is, “We have somebody who owns the van who tries to stop the officers from
searching his vehicle.” I don’t know what Mr. Williams meant by that. He could
have meant that it was, defendant says, go close the doors. That would be
stopping, trying to stop the search, it could be the statements made and yelling
about being upset. That could be interpreted that way. What I don’t find is that it
is not a comment that the defendant withdrew his consent under Fourth
Amendment, and that was the issue that we had earlier this morning on the motion
in limine. As I said earlier this morning, close line here. I don’t think the State
crossed that line, and that’s why I denied the motion for mistrial.
(Trial Tr., p.283, L.15 – p.284, L.12.) The State claims that the district court correctly concluded
that it was not clear that the prosecutor was referring to the consent revocation—the prosecutor
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could have been referring to Mr. Reed’s request that the K-9 officer close the van doors before
the dog performed a free air sniff. (Resp. Br., pp.19-23.)
However, the district court’s conclusions are illogical—why would shutting the doors
stop the search? There are really only two ways to stop the search of the vehicle: (1) where the
defendant tries to physically stop the officer by grabbing them, or (2) by revoking consent. It is
absurd to think that shutting the door of a car would stop the sniff search and that is not what the
prosecutor was talking about—clearly he was referring to the officer’s search of the car pursuant
to Mr. Reed’s initial consent, not the later sniff search (which legally is not a search at all) of the
car after Mr. Reed revoked consent. The pertinent phrase, “We have somebody who owns the
van who tries to stop the officers from searching his vehicle,” cannot refer to the dog sniff, based
on a simple reading of the sentence.
The district court also explained that the prosecutor’s comment might be about the
statements made by Mr. Reed and his yelling. (Trial Tr., p.284, Ls.4-5.) All of these things are
part and parcel with Mr. Reed’s assertion of his constitutional right to revoke consent. (See App.
Br., pp.26-35.) They are inextricably entwined and only emphasize why the district court erred
in allowing the prosecutor to come so close to saying the word “revoke,” but instead describing
in detail the revocation, avoiding only the actual word “revoke.”
The State tries to defend the district court’s reasoning explaining its decision—that “it
was unclear whether the state’s comments referred to the consent revocation. . .”

(Resp.

Br., p.19.) However, the district court erred by denying Mr. Reed’s motion for a mistrial where
the court failed to recognize the continuing impact on Mr. Reed’s right to a fair trial after it
permitted the prosecutor to tell the jury that Mr. Reed objected to the search, despite its previous
ruling prohibiting such evidence. Here, “the event which precipitated the motion for mistrial
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represented reversible error when viewed in the context of the full record.” State v. Johnson, 163
Idaho 412, __, 414 P.3d 234, 243 (2018) (quoting State v. Sandoval-Tena, 138 Idaho 908, 912
(2003)).
The objection was based on a prior ruling that references to evidence that Mr. Reed
revoked his consent to search the van would be inadmissible. Defense counsel sought to exclude
any part of the words or conduct by which Mr. Reed revoked his consent from being admitted.
(Trial Tr., p.156, Ls.13-25.)
After hearing the motion in limine, the district court ruled:
[S]o my ruling is that the State cannot ask about revocation of consent. The State
cannot make the argument that revocation of consent shows consciousness of
guilt or knowledge. I don’t – I mean, it’s a different issue, but its essentially one
and the same things, and I understand that’s an element of your case, and you
have to prove that, but I don’t see that revoking consent shows knowledge. I
mean, it could. I guess it’s inferential, but it’s also inferential for consciousness
of guilt, which is very troubling.
I don’t have a problem with the State asking the witness, you know, after the
passenger seat search, what was Mr. Reed’s demeanor, as long as it doesn’t cross
that line. And if he crosses the line, you’re going to get a mistrial. So you’re
going to have to make that call, whether it’s worth it to go down that line, and
you’re going to need to talk to your witness about it. Because if he blurts out
something about revocation of consent, I’ll grant a mistrial.
(Trial Tr., p.164, L.10 – p.165, L.4) (emphasis added). Yet, during closing arguments, the
following exchange occurred:
Prosecutor: . . . Here we have somebody who owns the van, who tries to stop the
officers from searching his vehicle only after they started it.
Defense Counsel: I’m going to object, Your Honor. I think that goes directly to
the issue we had about the constitutional right asserted, and I move for mistrial.
Prosecutor: No. Just gets upset and requires the officer to call in a K9 unit.
The Court: Hang on a minute. Objection’s noted for the record. Motion’s denied.
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(Trial Tr., p.265, Ls.9-20.) The standard for a mistrial is provided by Idaho Criminal Rule 29.1,
which states:
A mistrial may be declared on motion of the defendant when there occurs during
the trial, either inside or outside the courtroom, an error or legal defect in the
proceedings, or conduct that is prejudicial to the defendant and deprives the
defendant of a fair trial.
I.C.R. 29.1(a).
The district court erred in denying the motion for a mistrial, finding that the prosecutor
did not cross the line. (Trial Tr., p.284, Ls.6-12.) It was reversible error where the prosecutor
argued “the repeated objections by the defendant common sensically say that’s because he knew
meth was under there, his seat.” (Trial Tr., p.275, Ls.3-6.) The prosecutor used the revocation to
infer the defendant’s knowledge of the methamphetamine.

This was conduct specifically

prohibited by the district court’s prior ruling that “the State cannot ask about the revocation of
consent” or “make the argument that revocation of consent shows consciousness of guilt or
knowledge.” (Trial Tr., p.164, Ls.10-13.) The prosecution asked the jury to find that Mr. Reed’s
objection showed an element of the offense—that his objection to the search proved his
knowledge that there was methamphetamine under the seat.
Thus, the district erred by failing to consider the impact of such an argument in light of
the record as a whole. Both defense counsel and the prosecutor agreed—the key in this case was
whether Mr. Reed knew there was methamphetamine under the driver’s seat of his van. (Trial
Tr., p.265, L.24 – p.266, L.2; p.273, L.21.) Telling the jury that Mr. Reed: (1) gave consent to
the search, and (2) “Mr. Reed objected to the search,” and (3) the officers stopped searching as a
result, is synonymous with telling the jury that Mr. Reed revoked his consent to the search.
Using the word “object” or some variation of it in place of the word “revoke” does not
circumvent the district court’s order that the jury would not learn that Mr. Reed revoked his
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consent to search the van. 2 Had the district court focused upon the continuing impact on the trial
of the incident that triggered the mistrial motion, it would have found that the trial was replete
with the prosecution’s use of Mr. Reed standing on his rights in order to prove the knowledge
element. For example, in rebuttal closing, the prosecutor told the jury “the repeated objections
by the defendant common sensically say that’s because he knew meth was under there, his seat.”
(Trial Tr., p.275, Ls.3-6.) Ultimately, the State argued exactly what it wanted to argue, and what
the district court had prohibited it from arguing in its pre-trial ruling: “The State cannot make
the argument that revocation of consent shows consciousness of guilt or knowledge.” (Trial
Tr., p.164, Ls.12-13.)
Mr. Reed asserts the district court committed reversible error when it denied his motion
for a mistrial. Despite the district court’s ruling that the State was prohibited from telling the
jury that Mr. Reed invoked his constitutional right to revoke consent to search his van, the State
improperly argued to the jury during closing argument that Mr. Reed’s objection to the search
was an indicator of his knowledge that there was methamphetamine in his van. In doing so, the
State also committed prosecutorial misconduct. (See App. Br., pp.43-49.)

2

Even if the word “object” or “objection” does not equate to “revoke” or “revocation”—which
Mr. Reed maintains that it does—the prosecution’s use of Mr. Reed’s “objection” to prove
knowledge constituted reversible error. Mr. Reed’s attempts to stop a search that the jury knew
he had previously consented to was revoking consent. Simply because the word “revoke” was
not used does not mean the defendant’s constitutional right was unaffected. Similar to when a
suspect invokes his right to counsel by saying “I want a lawyer,” he does not have to formally
say, “I invoke my right to counsel” in order for a court to find he invoked his constitutional right
to counsel. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994) (holding suspect “must
articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in
the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney.”).
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IV.
The State Committed Prosecutorial Misconduct In Closing Arguments
The State addressed two instances of prosecutorial misconduct. (Resp. Br., pp.24-33.)
The State claims that the prosecutor’s acts of telling the jury that Mr. Reed objected to the search
and telling the jury that Mr. Reed was trying to make a sympathy case was not misconduct and,
even if it was misconduct, it was harmless. (Resp. Br., pp.24-33.) However, Mr. Reed asserted
as error three instances of prosecutorial misconduct. (App. Br., pp.43-49.) The State failed to
respond to Mr. Reed’s preserved objection and argument that the prosecutor’s comments during
closing arguments constituted misconduct because they violated the district court’s prior ruling. 3
(App. Br., pp.43-45; see generally, Resp. Br.) The State thus failed to argue the error was
harmless.
As for Mr. Reed’s assertion that the prosecutor committed misconduct by again arguing
in rebuttal, “He’s the one who objected to officers searching his -- or to -- started getting
frustrated” (Trial Tr., p.276, Ls.8-9), the State based its fundamental error analysis on the
erroneous premise that defense counsel brought it up first. (Resp. Br., pp.29-31.) The State
claims that defense counsel, in his closing argument, “was the first person to tell the jury that
Reed ‘objected to the search of his car.’” (Respondent’s Brief, p.30.) However, the State fails to
acknowledge that the prosecutor had already told the jury, in his initial closing remarks, “Here
we have somebody who owns the van, who tries to stop the officers from searching his vehicle
only after they started it.” (Trial Tr., p.265, Ls.9-12.) Defense counsel did object to the
prosecutor’s inappropriate comment, and thereafter moved for a mistrial. (See Trial Tr., p.265,

3

The State did address the comment as it related to the mistrial standard, but failed to address the
comment as prosecutorial misconduct. (Resp. Br., pp.18-33.)
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Ls.13-15.)

Although the motion was denied, Mr. Reed clearly objected to that line of

prosecutorial argument; thus, it was no “tactical” decision.
The prosecutorial misconduct was not harmless because it denied Mr. Reed his right to a
fair trial. The State failed to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the misconduct did not
contribute to the verdict. In reviewing the trial as a whole, the prosecutor’s improper comments
likely influenced the jury.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Reed respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s order of
judgment and commitment and reverse the order which denied his motion to suppress.
Alternatively, Mr. Reed requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction.
DATED this 31st day of August, 2018.

/s/ Sally J. Cooley
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

10

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 31st day of August, 2018, I caused a true and correct
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KENNETH K JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
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/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
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